

Moon-Young Lee's Transcendence Ethics in Conflict Management: Lee's Nonviolence, Conflict Episode, and Principled Negotiation¹

Hun Myoung Park
International University of Japan
kucc625@iuj.ac.jp

Abstract

Moon-Young Lee's transcendence ethics are compared to Pondy's (1962) conflict episode and Fisher, Ury, and Patton's (2011) principled negotiation. Lee's nonviolence, like conflict episode, posits various phases of a conflict between the weak and the strong and requires the weak to persevere with persecution and wait patiently for the right time. Like principled negotiation, Lee's nonviolence adheres to rationality and objective standards without release of emotional enmity. Personal ethic to obtain knowledge and pursue agreement is consistent with principled negotiation, which suggests inventing options for mutual gain. Social ethic and self-sacrifice do not appear in conflict episode and principled negotiation. A conflict episode, "Lieutenant's Gentle Revolt," illustrates how Lee's nonviolence and principled negotiation can be effectively applied, especially to a bureaucratic model of conflict in which the counterpart is bad and powerful. Lee's nonviolence is a likely choice for those who do not have power and who are persecuted by the strong, but must deal with violence of the strong. In fact, nonviolence, although sounding only theoretical and idealistic, provides practical and realistic guidance for conflict management.

Key words :

Transcendence ethics, nonviolence, personal ethic, social ethic, self-sacrifice, perseverance, conflict management, conflict episode, principled negotiation, minimalism.

1) This paper is a revision of the second half of "Moon-Young Lee's Nonviolence and Transcendence Ethics in Conflict Management," which was presented at the Mini-Conference of Moon-Young Lee's Public Administration and Asian Democracy in Jeonju, South Korea, on October 24, 2015. The author would like to thank Kook-Chan Ahn, Hui Seok Seo, Moonkee Kim, Jong Il Kim, Sung Ho Chung, Dongwhan Kim, Gyunsoo Yoon, Chang Hoon Ko, Jaebok Song, Young-Pyoung Kim, and Yung Chul Lee for their comments and encouragement.

Introduction

Park (2015) showed that Moon-Young Lee's images as a pro-democracy fighter, idealist, radical liberalist, left-winger, and pro-communist were purposely manipulated and completely misbranded. Lee identified himself as a dissident intellectual, public administration scholar, realistic idealist, Glorious Revolutionist, capitalist, moderate conservative, and Korean Puritan (Park, 2015, p. 285). He was an elder of a holiness church who believed in spiritual meditation and God for his entire life (Lee, 2001, p. 254; Lee, 2008, p. 500, 509–511). As a minimalist, Lee adhered to the minimum that people must stick to and should not compromise on (2008, pp. 150, 481).

The essence of Lee's theory of public administration lies in the framework of transcendence ethics: nonviolence, personal ethic, social ethic, and self-sacrifice. These ethics originate from the Four Gospels of the Holiness Church—healing, holiness, second coming, and rebirth (Lee, 1991, p. 32; Lee, 2001, p. 254; Lee, 2008, pp. 269–271)—which correspond respectively to trust, knowledge (feeling of approving and disapproving) and propriety (feeling of modesty and complaisance), benevolence (feeling of commiseration), and righteousness (feeling of shame and dislike) in Confucianism (Lee, 1996, pp. 403–406). Lee's transcendence ethics can be viewed as normative ethics, pathway to maturity, abilities, or strategies that the weak adopt to confront power abuse by the strong (Park, 2015, p. 287). Nonviolence and personal ethic fall into the category of "how," while social ethic and self-sacrifice into the "what" and the "who" categories, respectively (Lee, 1991, p. 49).

The uniqueness of Lee's transcendence ethics is found especially in nonviolence, which is rooted from his humanism, minimalism, and religious life (Park, 2015, p. 290). Lee's nonviolence is (1) not to use any violence but to use "word" instead, (2) to adhere to complete nonviolence as opposed to incomplete or half-baked nonviolence. (3) to tell right things (the truth), (4) to tell right things minimally, and (5) to be based on natural laws, formal laws and procedures, common sense, agreement, and other objective and rational standards (Park, 2015, pp. 290–291). The weak must rely upon nonviolence because (1) the weak do not have strong power to use violence, (2) they will be worse off from the use of violence, (3) they can protect themselves and survive by sticking to nonviolence, (4) nonviolence is a lethal weapon for the weak to defeat the strong, and (5) nonviolence has normative values (Park, 2015, pp. 291–292).

In order to put Lee's nonviolence into practice successfully, the weak should persevere with violence of the strong, endure the long road to

transcend from nonviolence to self-sacrifice, and wait patiently to the last minute until the right time comes (Lee, 1986, p. 298; Lee, 1996, p. 664; Lee, 2001, pp. 204, 348–350). Lee stated that perseverance includes all virtues with which the weak should equip and is the apex of nonviolence culture (Lee, 1980, p. 384). Perseverance is a synonym for Lee's nonviolence (Lee, 1986, p. 336), which is not to keep silence for nonresistance but to keep telling the right things (Lee, 1986, p. 294; Lee, 1991, p. 118; Lee, 2001, pp. 189, 246). In case of the most feared situation, Lee told only right words that even evil regimes could not rebuff reasonably (Lee, 1991, pp. 25–26; Lee, 1996, p. 56; Lee, 2008, pp. 66, 491, 497).

What, then, is the contribution of Lee's transcendence ethics to public administration? Which implications can we draw from his framework of transcendence ethics? This paper suggests that transcendence ethics are successfully applied to conflict management. Sections 2 and 3 compare Lee's transcendence ethics to Pondy's conflict episode and Fisher, Ury, and Patton's principled negotiation. Section 4 discusses strategies of Lee's nonviolence and principled negotiation to manage bureaucratic conflict, in particular. Section 5 introduces a case of "Lieutenant's Gentle Revolt" that illustrates how Lee's nonviolence can be successfully applied to conflict management. Section 6 discusses Lee's nonviolence and principled negotiation in the conflict episode case. Finally, this paper concludes that Lee's nonviolence and other transcendence ethics are not idealistic but rather realistic and practical in conflict management.

Conflict Episode in Conflict Management

Conflicts occur among individuals, groups, departments or agencies, and countries in various forms. Conflicts were often considered dysfunctional and destructive to employees and organizations. It was widely believed that conflicts should be discouraged and eliminated completely rather than managed appropriately. Pondy (1967) raised a question about this belief, arguing that conflict is not necessarily bad or good but may be functional and dysfunctional for organizations (pp. 298, 319). Conflict is inevitable in an organization and essential to its survival (Pondy, 1992). Pondy (1992) stated, "If conflict isn't happening, then the organization has no reason for being" (p. 259). This view calls for conflict handling strategies to manage conflicts and make them beneficial to organizations. For instance, Thomas (1976, 1992) suggested five strategies of conflict management depending on assertiveness and cooperativeness: avoidance, accommodation, compromise, competing, and

collaborating.

Pondy (1967) also argued that conflict is not an occasional outbreak or happening but rather a dynamic process consisting of a series of interlocking conflict episodes (pp. 298–299). He identified five stages of conflict episode: latent conflict, perceived conflict, felt conflict, manifest conflict, and conflict aftermath (Pondy, 1967, pp. 300–306). Antecedent conditions (e.g., competition for scarce resources) set a latent conflict stage before the conflict develops. People are aware of conflict (perceived conflict) to reach a cognitive state. A conflict in an affective state results in, for instance, discomfort, anxiety, and hostility (felt conflict). Manifest conflict becomes open warfare and involves conflictual behavior that may be destructive if not managed properly. Finally, conflict aftermath is the stage after the outbreak. These conflict episodes do not necessarily go through each stage one by one (Pondy, 1967, p. 299) and they change over time to show “unending waves” (Pondy, 1992, p. 257). Accordingly, a manager needs to be an orchestrator who manages (rather than resolves) conflict to make it constructive and to avoid the worst phase (Pondy, 1992, p. 261).

Lee contended that the weak should have a thorough and rigorous understanding of the real world (1986, p. 298), endure violence of the strong (2001, p. 204), persevere to the last minute (1986, p. 298; 2001, p. 350; 2008, p. 202), and tenaciously wait for a long time (1986, p. 335; 2001, p. 204). Nonviolence is not to remain silence and do nothing, but to ensure plausibility of action and to tell the truth even if being threatened (Lee, 1986, pp. 294–295). When the day comes, the weak have to tell the truth or take the minimal action under the most feared situation at the risk of being persecuted (Lee, 1991, pp. 25–26; Lee, 1996, pp. 56, 673–674; Lee, 2008, p. 491).² It is crucial for the weak to wait patiently until the right time and then to tell the right things minimally at that moment (Park, 2015, p. 294). The strong, without legitimacy, will self-collapse because they rely on violence and naked power rather than rationality (Park, 2015, p. 293). Accordingly, the weak should endure violence and persevere to the last moment; otherwise, imprudent violence or imperfect nonviolence will reanimate the strong who will retaliate against the weak.

2) Lee described five worst states, in order, occurring under dictatorship: (1) a bad regime suppresses the press and prevents people from speaking out, (2) the regime removes political rivals, (3) ordinary citizens are deprived of their desire to stand by right things, (4) the regime invests in showcase projects (e.g., national wealth and arms race) rather than improves social welfare, and eventually (5) the regime is intervened by neighboring countries and its regime becomes ossified too much to listen to its citizens' voice (1996, pp. 368–390; 2001, pp. 184–202).

Principled Negotiation and Lee's Nonviolence

Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) suggested principled negotiation, as an alternative to positional bargaining. In positional bargaining, two parties stubbornly stick to their own positions rather than look for likely solutions acceptable to both. Whether the bargainer is soft or hard, positional bargaining does not produce an efficient and amicable outcome (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 4). By contrast, principled negotiation relies upon rationality and objectivity to reach wise agreement efficiently and amicably. This alternative approach has four principles or strategies: (1) separate the people from the problem, (2) focus on interests, not positions, (3) invent multiple options for mutual gain, and (4) insist on using objective criteria independent of the will of both parties (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 10–15).

The first point is to disentangle the subjective human relationship from the objective and substantive problem (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 21–24). That is, “attack the problem without blaming the people” to reframe the game into a principled negotiation (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 56). People are rational and logical on the one hand, but emotional, illogical, and error-prone on the other. Participants need to understand empathetically how their counterpart views the issue and make their proposal consistent with their counterpart's value and/or face. However, they should neither speak about nor blame their counterpart for their problem (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 27, 38–39). Also, both parties ought not to release emotions to cause an emotional reaction from their counterpart (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 34). This principle is consistent with Lee's nonviolence to use “word” instead of violence and adhere to complete nonviolence.³ Lee (1996) said that the weak should use “word” only and tell only what is right and really needed (p. 56). Even a minor release of emotional enmity can be incomplete nonviolence to attack the adversary (people) rather than the problem.

The second principle is to focus on interests, not positions. The fundamental of a conflicting problem lies in the players' interests, such as needs, desires, concerns, and fears, and not in their position (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 42). An interest is an ultimate goal or underlying force that causes a particular position. A position tends to be concrete and explicit, while its underlying interests are likely to be implicit and intangible (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 45). Since multiple possible positions exist behind an interest, the

3) Lee (1980, 1991, 2011) corresponded three public pledges of the March 1, 1919 Korean Declaration of Independence to who–what–how categorization and then transcendence ethics. The first pledge says “Today's protest is to claim justice, humanity, survival, and prosperity of our people. Accordingly, we shall solely manifest the spirit of liberty, but never deviate into exclusion of others.”

players need to identify underlying interests that are shared, compatible, or complementary. In the 1978 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, for example, underlying interests were sovereignty for Egypt and national security for Israel, both of which were satisfied by demilitarizing the Sinai Peninsula (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 43–44). Lee’s nonviolence is to use “word” only and tell right things minimally. This minimal action requires concentration on essential and fundamental issues (underlying interest) (Park, 2015, p. 291).

Inventing many options for mutual gain is a useful skill at the planning stage. It is important to separate the process of developing or broadening possible alternatives from the process of making decisions (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 62–67). Participants need to identify shared interests and then look for options that can satisfy both sides (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 72–75). Lee emphasized that the weak should tell very right things that even an evil regime dares not rationally refuse (Lee, 2008, p. 66). The right things and objective options are likely to be accepted by both sides, mainly due to rationality, fairness, and legitimacy. Searching for right things and inventing many options require related knowledge (i.e., knowing logics of things), which is described as Lee’s personal ethic (1991, p. 49; 1996, p. 404; 2001, p. 373).

⟨Table 1⟩ Comparing Lee’s nonviolence, principled negotiation, and positional bargaining.

Lee’s nonviolence	Principled negotiation	Positional bargaining
Use “word” instead of violence Adhere to complete nonviolence	Separate people from problem	Make or demand concessions
Tell the right things minimally	Focus on interests, not positions	Stick to position
Tell the right things	Invent options for mutual gain	Accept or demand one-sided gains
Be based on objective rules	Insist on using objective criteria	Insist on your position

Source: Lee (1991, 1996, 2001, 2008) and Fisher, Ury, & Patton (2011).

Finally, good principled negotiators develop and negotiate fair standards and procedures that are legitimate, practical, and independent of the players’ preferences and will (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 86–88). Fair standards include market price, scientific judgment, moral/professional standards, convention, tradition, and law. Fair procedures, such as taking turns and flipping a coin, give both parties equal opportunities and thus use the inherent fairness of chance (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 87–

88). Lee’s nonviolence also asks to strictly abide by rational and objective criteria, including common sense and precedents (Park, 2015, p. 291). It is notable that Lee’s personal ethic suggests pursuing agreement among stakeholders and obtaining knowledge and skills (1991, p. 49; 1996, p. 404; 2001, p. 373).

Lee’s Nonviolence and Principled Negotiation for Bureaucratic Conflict

Pondy (1967) identified three models of conflict: bargaining, bureaucratic, and systems models. While the bargaining model of conflict is to deal with conflicts among interest groups to compete for scarce resources, the bureaucratic model is to manage superior–subordinate conflicts in a hierarchy when superiors want to control subordinates who resist such control (Pondy, 1967, pp. 312–316). Lee primarily focused on the bureaucratic conflict between the weak and the strong, and suggested how the weak can protect themselves from and overcome power abuse of the strong. By contrast, Fisher et al. (2011) mainly discussed bargaining conflicts among parties and showed how to reach a wise agreement peacefully.

Fisher et al. (2011) argued their principled negotiation can still be applied even to the worst bureaucratic conflict in which the counterpart was more powerful and used dirty tricks. Bad counterparts may misrepresent facts, authority, or intentions (deliberative deception); make you feel uncomfortable, stressed, and threatened (psychological warfare); and exert positional pressures, such as extreme demand, lock-in tactics, and calculated delay (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 134–144). Lee posits the weak who suffer from merciless violence of the strong who misuse their power.

Establishing the worst acceptable outcome (bottom line) or playing a tit-for-tat against a bad counterpart, despite their minor advantages, may fail to reach a wise agreement with an evil counterpart (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 99–101). It will be foolhardy for the weak to try to retaliate against the strong with violence. The solution is the principled negotiation on the merits and negotiation about the rules of the game on the basis of reciprocity rather than substance (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 132–134). Fisher et al. (2011) suggested using the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) rather than simply giving in to evil (p. 102). The weak need to overcome self-defeating attitudes and self-abandonment and then reframe the interests, options, objective standards, and BATNA of both parties (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 181–194).

BATNA is the best option for the weak if they fail to reach an agreement. The weak mobilize their knowledge, money, reputation, personal ties, and other assets fully to develop alternative actions. This approach will make the weak confident in the negotiation process, protect them from accepting unfavorable offers, and provide flexibility to explore more possible solutions, thus minimizing the likelihood of missing the better one (Fisher et al., 2011, pp. 102, 106).

BATNA is not a solution per se, but just an option other than negotiation. Nevertheless, it is valuable for the weak to overcome self-defeat and have confidence to confront the strong. Lee's nonviolence and minimalism require courage to tell the truth at the risk of being persecuted by the strong (2008, pp. 491, 615). Lee's nonviolence, in fact, is the BATNA of the weak in the sense that they cannot be better off by shaking their fists and releasing feelings of anger and hostility. The effort of identifying BATNA is personal ethic (i.e., acquisition of knowledge and skills) in Lee's framework of transcendence ethics.

The next section, "Lieutenant's Gentle Revolt," introduces a conflict episode between a brigadier general and his subordinate lieutenant, a public relations (PR) officer, in a military unit. This case illustrates how the lower ranked lieutenant can survive and achieve his goals successfully by using Lee's nonviolence and principled negotiation.

A Conflict Episode: Lieutenant's Gentle Revolt

The brigadier had a good personality and expertise in his field but also excessive pride in his rank and authority. His authoritarian leadership gave enlisted soldiers and officers a hard time because he always wanted to walk his own way.

The brigadier was extremely proud of his recent promotion. He wanted his staff members to place him on a pedestal, although such old-fashioned honorable treatment was prohibited because it lacked legal grounds. After obtaining a one-star rank, the brigadier often complained of being treated in a way he did not expect. One day, the brigadier became upset about his garden, which had been left unweeded for a long time. He ordered his staff members, from the chief of staff (colonel) to staff sergeant, to fall in line in front of his office. In very magisterial tones, the brigadier gave a long sermon about how staff members should elevate him. After the surprising marshaling, the chief of staff and other senior officers had to weed the garden themselves. Watching that miserable scene, the lieutenant whispered in regret, "What a shame!"

One day, some soldiers of a subunit returned late from their stay-over. The brigadier became

angry and decided not to allow stay-overs or leaves, which provided the "only oasis" for enlisted soldiers. In addition, he ordered all officers and staff members to stay in their units without going home for two months. Several weeks later, the lieutenant, as the special staff officer in charge of morale and PR, surveyed the subunits and found that most officers and soldiers were suffering from punishing stress—their morale had fallen to a dangerously low level. He brought this issue to the brigadier and then suggested reinstating stay-overs and leaves to boost morale.

In response to the lieutenant's professional suggestion based on his expertise, the brigadier replied in anger, "Lieutenant, do you know what the army is? Do you know what a cannon is?" Believing the situation was terribly bad, the lieutenant again made the same suggestion to the brigadier at a regular staff meeting. The brigadier stared fiercely at him and yelled at the brave officer, "Lieutenant, stop it!" However, at another meeting, the lieutenant again repeated his suggestion. The brigadier shouted at the stubborn officer, "Lieutenant, shut up!" Even the lieutenant's immediate boss (lieutenant colonel) warned him, "Hey boy, stop here. I agree with you, but the brigadier already made his decision. That's it!"

A week later, the lieutenant and the lieutenant colonel were on night duty. An emergency call from a subunit came around 1:00 a.m. A soldier had committed suicide at a battery. After hanging up, the lieutenant was lost for words for a while. "Oh... my..." His boss, the lieutenant colonel, was speechless too. Two hours later there was another emergency call. The same subunit reported another suicide case. The lieutenant received both reports but could not understand them. How could these incidents happen in the same subunit at almost the same time?

The brigadier was shocked by the news. He stayed in his office, groaning and moaning from time to time. His boss, the corps commander, concluded that the prohibition of stay-overs and leaves caused the tragedies and thus overruled the brigadier's decision immediately. Ironically, the brigadier became the only officer in the unit who could not go home for weeks. The lieutenant believed that the brigadier's poor management skills killed two innocent soldiers. He felt sorry for the soldiers and even guilty. The brigadier may have been a cannon expert, the lieutenant thought, but he was not a good manager.

The brigadier had an obsession with photography. Since personal photography was not an official duty of the brigade, neither a camera nor photographer was officially assigned to the unit. Nevertheless, the brigadier usually ordered the lieutenant to take pictures of himself and other officers. Private

A, despite his master of specialty (M.O.S.) in telecommunication, was unofficially assigned to the PR department largely because he had an expensive professional single-lens reflex (SLR) camera. A cheap compact camera was never acceptable to the obsessive general.

Unfortunately, Private A suffered from serious arthritis in his back and a doctor strongly recommended his immediate hospitalization. Concerned about the private's post-discharge future, the lieutenant asked the brigadier to send Private A to a hospital for surgery. The brigadier approved the suggestion initially but later changed his mind. He wanted to take the photographer to a party in his hometown to celebrate his promotion. Later realizing this fact, the lieutenant became furious at the brigadier's egoistic decision to take advantage of Private A and his SLR camera. The lieutenant repeated the same request couple of times, but the brigadier always rebuffed him nervously without explaining why. Frustrated and upset, the lieutenant resolutely ordered Private A to leave his SLR camera at home, which was very close to the brigadier's hometown, on the way back to the unit after the party. The private understood what the lieutenant meant and returned to the headquarters without his SLR camera.

Weeks later, the brigadier called the lieutenant and ordered photography for an annual meeting, attended by all subunit officers, at which a major would receive an Army Chief of Staff award. The lieutenant intuitively realized that the right moment approached. He was confident that the brigadier, although often cranky, was not a brutal dictator devoid of ethics and that "working to rules" was the right answer to such a peevish person.

The lieutenant pretended to prepare for the annual meeting by asking each officer whether he had a good SLR camera; accordingly, all officers acknowledged that the lieutenant was trying his best to undertake the mission that the brigadier had ordered. On the day of the meeting, the lieutenant ordered Private B to wear clean military clothing, combat boots, and a photography armband because Private A was sick in bed with backache. Then the lieutenant had Private B wait on standby at the door of the meeting room without a camera. Imagine a cameraman without a camera! All PR officers and soldiers, who knew well the lieutenant's generosity and integrity, realized a horrible storm was brewing up and became disturbed.

In the meeting room, the lieutenant sat at the last chair of the main table (only major or higher officers were seated there) and Private B stood restlessly behind the lieutenant. All the officers found their seats and stood at attention. The brigadier entered the meeting room. As expected, he initially checked the photographer and, right before taking his seat,

realized that the "well-suited" cameraman was idly standing in a panic without a camera. The brigadier immediately stared at the lieutenant, shivering with anger. All the officers were frozen in a dreadful silence for a minute. Yes, it appeared to be the "longest minute" of their lives.

The lieutenant calmly broke the choking silence, pushing himself out of his seat and placing his hip at the tip of his chair. He moved mechanically as an automaton bird appeared out of a cuckoo clock. Without turning to the brigadier, he said with a straight face, as though he were reading from a textbook, that photography was not his official duty; therefore, photography equipment (i.e., a SLR camera) was not assigned to the unit. The lieutenant added that he had tried his best to complete the mission given by the brigadier, but he could not find a suitable SLR camera. As a result, he could only prepare a well-arranged photographer. After finishing his "textbook reading," the lieutenant quietly pushed himself back into his seat and looked straight ahead. The brigadier burst with rage and roared,

"You bastard! You wanna die?"

All of sudden, the brigadier drew out his gun, shuddering and grinding his teeth with anger and shame. No one dared move at that moment. Private B confessed after the meeting that he had shut his eyes firmly and thought, "I'm done for here!" Even after sitting down, the brigadier could not suppress his anger and he fixed his gaze on his stubborn enemy, the lieutenant. A large portion of the brigadier's comments constituted furious preaching about obligation and sincerity toward one's boss, meaning, the brigadier himself. However, the lieutenant kept his calm countenance "on purpose" during the entire meeting. The brigadier was defeated and openly disgraced by the lieutenant's "textbook reading," "zero-emotion," and "working to rules" tactics.

After the meeting, the lieutenant stood outside, relaxing and enjoying a gentle breeze. A major in charge of logistics approached him. The lieutenant turned around and looked at him. The major gave a "thumbs up" with a full smile on his face. He added, "You won! Now, you become two-star major general equivalent!"

The lieutenant smiled back and then simply, but with gravity, said,

"Thanks, major."

The major ludicrously saluted the honorable major general equivalent (MGE), the lieutenant,

"Yes, sir!"

Almost all of the officers in the headquarters and subunits were supportive of what the lieutenant had done in the meeting because they felt badly about the brigadier's authoritative management style. One lieutenant colonel later chuckled at the memory of

the annual meeting and joked,

“Hey lieutenant, don’t be so harsh with the old man! Take it easy and give him a break. Ha-ha-ha…”

Not surprisingly, the brigadier was angry about being dishonored publicly by the lieutenant. The brigadier appeared to seek a chance to retaliate against the lieutenant. He invited all lieutenants and second lieutenants in the headquarters to his official residence on a holiday. However, the lieutenant planned to go hiking in a nearby mountain on that day. The brigadier said, “Come to my residence unless you have an appointment or something to do.” The lieutenant intentionally interpreted the invitation literally and said to himself, “Sorry, I have a prior plan for that day.” After reporting to an officer on night duty, he went hiking as scheduled.

The brigadier was enraged by the lieutenant’s purposive failure to attend his party. Unfortunately, the brigadier’s assistant, a second lieutenant who was under the lieutenant’s control, happened to go without permission to his home to spend time with his family members on that holiday. Doing so was against military law and made the brigadier angry again.

At last, the brigadier found a good chance for retaliation against the lieutenant. He announced at a meeting that he would have the two “profane” officers punished under military criminal law. When the lieutenant visited his office to report after the holiday, the brigadier neither turned around nor maintained eye contact, but just listened without saying a word. He became pickier and scolded staff members even for trivial issues at the meeting for days, exerting implicit “huffing and puffing” pressure on the lieutenant.

However, the lieutenant neither excused himself nor made any apology. He knew what the brigadier really wanted. The brigadier did not, however, realize that military criminal law could not be applied to an MGE case (i.e., hiking nearby instead of attending a personal party on a holiday). Most military prosecutors and judges in the unit were quite friendly to the lieutenant. Instead, the lieutenant was concerned about his responsibility for the careless second lieutenant who violated the law. He also was concerned about other innocent officers who became more stressed at the daily meeting. Of course, these worries were intended to force the lieutenant’s apology.

Although the brigadier officially announced severe punishment for the lieutenant, his human resource management staff officer could not find any legal clause or sentence to apply to the lieutenant’s case. By contrast, the lieutenant already knew this fact because he checked with his friend, an expert in military law, before starting the “gentle revolt.” Realizing the impossibility of punishing his “enemy,”

the brigadier appeared to ask the chief of staff (colonel) to wrap this self-esteem battle up quickly. The brigadier knew that he could not get anything (e.g., punishment and apology) from the “obstinate and invincible” lieutenant. The chief of staff faced a dilemma of a one-star brigadier at odds with the “major general equivalent.”

Days later, the chief of staff offered a suggestion to the lieutenant, emphasizing the early termination of destructive conflicts. He suggested writing a daily apology letter to the brigadier and full-armed walking around the parade ground for a week, reflecting on what the brigadier wanted. These penalties were the cost for humiliating the brigadier. The chief of staff talked to the lieutenant directly, “Lieutenant, save his face, … Please!” Understanding the weak negotiating position of the brigadier and the chief of staff, the lieutenant was eager to accept the offer but made counter-offers politely.

“Sir, I completely understand what you mean. I will accept, of course. But, … did you say a week?”

The chief of staff smiled but unwillingly replied after several seconds of hesitation.

“Hummm… Three days!”

The lieutenant smiled back to him and answered, “O.K.” He then asked,

“And did you mean three hours of walking?”

The chief of staff replied immediately,

“No, two hours. Is that O.K. for you?”

The lieutenant answered contentedly.

“(Call!) All right. Much better, Sir.”

The chief of staff replied with a sigh of relief.

“Thanks!”

Soon after returning to his battalion, the lieutenant was scheduled to leave the unit. Several days before the lieutenant’s moving out, the brigadier made a surprise visit to the battalion and pretended to do business. He wanted to play soccer with the officers and the soldiers in the afternoon. In so-called “royal soccer,” subordinates are expected to pass a ball very gently to their boss, who is usually waiting in front of the goalposts, so that he can kick the ball in easily.

The lieutenant was playing around the center circle to support the brigadier ahead. When the battalion commander (lieutenant colonel) passed the ball to the brigadier, everyone thought that the brigadier would kick the ball into the goalposts. However, the brigadier suddenly turned around and passed the ball back to the lieutenant “politely,” yelling at him, “Lieutenant, shoot it!” Embarrassed by such an unexpected pass, the lieutenant kicked the ball out of urgency. All the other officers and soldiers were surprised at the odd scene. A senior officer said later, “I have never seen in my life a brigadier pass a ball to a lieutenant, even in such a gentle manner. You must have something special!”

After the soccer game, the brigadier hosted a dinner party for officers and other staff members. He spent most of the time talking to the battalion commander and majors nearby while the lieutenant intentionally seated himself opposite the brigadier. After the party, the brigadier was standing at the entrance door to shake hands with each officer. Each officer was expected to salute and then state his rank and name when the brigadier shook his hand. When the lieutenant was about to salute in his turn, the brigadier abruptly hugged him for a few seconds and then clapped him on the cheek slightly, murmuring something unclear. Nevertheless, the lieutenant could understand what the one-star general wanted to convey (mixed feelings of anger, regret, appreciation, etc.).⁴

Lee's Nonviolence in the Lieutenant's Gentle Revolt

The lieutenant successfully applied transcendence ethics (nonviolence) and principled negotiation strategies to a bureaucratic model of conflict. First, the lieutenant endured the brigadier's violence, waited patiently for a long time, and persevered until the last moment. The weak need prudent recognition of reality and must wait patiently until a condition becomes ripe for actions. Based on complete understanding of conflict episodes, the lieutenant planned the gentle revolt systematically and waited for a right moment without becoming agitated. For instance, he checked the military laws, field manuals, and rules thoroughly in advance in order for "working to rules." He worked hard to find out right things and increase plausibility of his action. Then he told the truth minimally at the right time. By contrast, the brigadier had an overconfidence of power and thus took impromptu actions carelessly without perseverance.

Second, the lieutenant never used violence but told the right things. His "word" was rational enough so that the brigadier could hardly refuse it (Lee, 2008, pp. 66, 435). He used complete nonviolence and controlled emotional outburst (i.e., verbal and gestural violence) against the brigadier. His mechanical movement and straight face in the room were serious attempts to adhere

to perfect nonviolence. In particular, his "textbook-reading" or "zero-emotion" policy was the climax of the gentle revolt, which illustrated how the weak stayed calm even at the manifest conflict stage. The lieutenant understood clearly what he could and could not do, and what he had to say and how. He indeed separated people from the problem and then concentrated on the problem. However, the brigadier poured out his anger at the lieutenant and even drew out a gun. His verbal and gestural violence threatened all the officers and the soldiers in the room, slashing his legitimacy and authority.

Third, the lieutenant mentioned facts and rules only. He used "word" only and told the truth minimally. He talked about tasks and missions without becoming agitated by the brigadier's violent outburst. In his apology letters, the lieutenant discussed authority and management issues academically without criticizing or complaining. He focused on interests, not on positions. The lieutenant knew that even a tiny mistake in response could drive himself into the corner immediately. The brigadier, by contrast, lost his temper completely and preached a right way of serving the brigadier rather than discussed agendas at the formal meeting. He feared the right "word" and truth that attack his mistakes in a decent manner. The brigadier would welcome the lieutenant's violence and half-baked nonviolence.

Fourth, the lieutenant told the right things that the brigadier could not refuse. He explained rules and made suggestions based on facts. He wanted to hospitalize the senior private who suffered from the brigadier's power abuse and transform the brigadier's management style. When planning the "gentle revolt," the lieutenant considered various aspects related to the conflict with his arbitrary boss and chose the most likely option, "working to rules." He also compromised with the brigadier even though he did nothing wrong when a second lieutenant under his control violated a military rule. The dialog with the chief of staff illustrated how the lieutenant negotiated for mutual gain of the brigadier and all staff officers. He eagerly sacrificed himself (i.e., full-armed walking) to bring peace back to the unit. The lieutenant tried to invent options and pursue mutual gain, whereas the brigadier stuck to his position only. The brigadier tried to retaliate against the lieutenant to save face. This attempt was another violence that pushed the brigadier deeper into a trap.

Fifth, the lieutenant's actions were based on rational and objective standards, such as military law, rules, procedures, ethics, and common sense whereas the brigadier relied on his naked power. His suggestions and decisions were aimed at ensuring basic human rights of soldiers and abiding by laws and rules. The brigadier appeared to believe

4) The aftermath of this gentle revolt includes (1) the private soldier was sent to a hospital for surgery, (2) the brigadier decided to retaliate against the lieutenant and looked for a chance, and (3) the lieutenant kept "working to rules" and trying to avoid any mistake in order to prevent the brigadier's retaliation. The lieutenant never yielded to the brigadier's pressure and apologized. The brigadier tried to punish the lieutenant for not attending his party but ended up losing his face again. Nevertheless, the lieutenant eagerly negotiated a back-door deal and received minor penalty of full-armed walking to save the brigadier's face and relieve staff officers' stress.

that authority is given automatically by the job title. However, authority needs to be developed and managed properly to influence others successfully. The brigadier did not pay attention to such objective criteria (e.g., military criminal law) and accordingly had to unwillingly admit his mistakes after losing his face openly.

Sixth, one indirect and unintended consequence of sticking to transcendence ethics (nonviolence) is that the strong are goaded into losing control, resorting to severer violence, and eventually destroying themselves. This goading effect is not meant by Lee's nonviolence, but Lee (2008) appeared to take advantage of the similar effect (pp. 296–299). Nonviolence not only strengthens morality and legitimacy of the weak but also spotlights illegality, brutality, and injustice of the strong. As the legitimacy gap between the weak and strong widens, the weak are likely to obtain strong support from their neighbors, whereas a dictator's power will wane rapidly. The strong tend to be overconfident in their naked power and less likely to expect nonviolent reaction from the weak. "Textbook-reading" and "working to rules" made an arbitrary brigadier embarrassed and more dependent on violence. These provocative nonviolent strategies irritated a dictator who suffers from illegitimacy and inferior complex. The brigadier became totally lost by the lieutenant's well-prepared nonviolence, failed to control his emotion, and made a series of false moves that eventually pushed him into a checkmate.

⟨Table 1⟩ Comparing Lee's nonviolence, principled negotiation, and positional bargaining.

Lee's nonviolence	Brigadier general	Major general equivalent
Persevere and wait patiently	Never be patient Take impromptu actions	Persevere and wait to the last minute Be prepared and planned well
Use "word" instead of violence Adhere to complete nonviolence	Release of emotional enmity Draw out a gun and threaten	No verbal and gestural violence Textbook-reading, keeping silent
Tell the right things minimally	Preach and complain Less talk about tasks and missions	Tell the rules and facts only Focus on tasks and missions
Tell the right things	Stick to the position Try to retaliate to save his face	Tell the rules and facts Compromise to save colleagues
Be based on objective rules	Naked power Authority is given automatically	Law, principles, common sense Authority is to be managed

Finally, Lee's nonviolence is a prior condition or minimum requirement to avoid the worst. The weak need to give up using fists before moving on toward maturity or higher ethics (Lee, 2001, p. 149). Nonviolence is implicitly assumed in bargaining and negotiation. Hence, Lee's nonviolence rarely appears in Pondy (1967) and Fisher et al. (2011). Pondy (1992) says, "The use of raw power or of violence for redressing grievances or for altering the fundamental nature of the relationship played little or no role in the model" (p. 257). Lee's personal ethic (i.e., knowledge and agreement) appeared in principled negotiation but social ethic and self-sacrifice did not because principled negotiation handles primarily bargaining conflict rather than bureaucratic one.

Conclusion

Lee's transcendence ethics presupposes multiple phases of a conflict that are similar to Pondy's (1967) conflict episode. The weak should persevere with violence of the strong, keep telling the right things only, and patiently wait for the right time to take minimal action. The action under the most feared time is to tell the truth that even an evil dares not rebuff (Lee, 1991, pp. 25–26; Lee, 1996, p. 56). Lee's transcendence ethics, in particular, nonviolence is closely related to Fisher et al.'s (2011) principled negotiation (see Tables 1 and 2). Both approaches deny violence, rely upon rationality, and pursue mutual gain (wise agreement and peace). Citing Mencius (1970, pp. 157–158), Lee emphasizes that violent emotional release of the weak should be avoided just as dictator's brutal violence should be stopped (Lee, 1986, pp. 81–82, 297).

The lieutenant's gentle revolt illustrates how transcendence ethics (nonviolence), conflict episode, and principled negotiation can be successfully applied to a bureaucratic conflict in which the counterpart misuses his power and threatens the weak. Like the lieutenant, the weak have to (1) prepare a comprehensive scenario based on thorough and rigorous understanding of the reality, (2) endure the violence of the strong and wait patiently until the right time comes, (3) use "word" instead of any type of violence, (4) adhere to the complete nonviolence, (5) tell the right things (truth), (6) tell the right things minimally, and (7) be based on objective standards and criteria. The weak should be cautious and well prepared because they cannot expect fairness and justice from an arbitrary counterpart.

Lee's transcendence ethics appear to be best applied to conflict management in public administration. Lee's nonviolence, although

sounding theoretical and idealistic only, provides realistic and practical strategies to those who suffer from violence of the strong. Nonviolence is a dominant strategy, or BATNA, for the weak who persevere to the right moment. Lee (1991) notes, "Abstinence [perseverance] is not lethargy but the power to wait, power to grow, and power that is stronger than violence" (p.19).⁵ In fact, this "nonviolent weapon" protected Lee from a dictator's violence and political persecution. Lee's transcendence ethics, in particular, nonviolence can be applied to other bureaucratic conflicts in which, for example, a public manager has to deal with violent subordinates.

References

- Dalton, D. (2012). *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent power in action*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in* (3rd ed.). New York: Penguin.
- Lee, M. Y. (1980). *한국행정론 [Korean public administration]*. Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak.
- Lee, M. Y. (1986). *겁많은 자의 용기 [Cowardly man's courage]* (2nd ed.). Seoul, Korea: Joongwon Culture.
- Lee, M. Y. (1991). *자전적 행정학 [Autobiographical public administration]*. Seoul, Korea: Silcheon Munhak.
- Lee, M. Y. (1996). *논어맹자와 행정학 [The analects of Confucius, the works of Mencius, and public administration]*. Seoul, Korea: Nanam Publishing House.
- Lee, M. Y. (2001). *인간 종교 국가: 미국행정, 청교도 정신, 그리고 마르틴 루터의 95개조 [Man, religion, and state: American public administration, Puritanism, and Martin Luther's 95 Theses]*. Seoul, Korea: Nanam Publishing House.
- Lee, M. Y. (2008). *겁많은 자의 용기: 지켜야 할 최소에 관한 이야기 [Cowardly man's courage: A tail about the minimum to which ordinary men must adhere]*. Seoul, Korea: Samin.
- Lee, M. Y. (2011). *3.1운동에서 본 행정학 [Public administration from the March 1st Movement Perspective]*. Seoul, Korea: Korea University Press.
- Mencius. (1970). *The works of Mencius* (J. Legge, Trans.). New York: Dover Publications.
- Park, H. M. (2015). Moon-Young Lee's transcendence ethics for democratic public administration: Meanings and rationales of Lee's nonviolence. *World Environment and Island Studies*, 5(4), 283-296.
- Pondy, L. R. (1967). Organization conflict: Concepts and models. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12(2), 296-320.
- Pondy, L. R. (1992). Reflections on organizational conflict. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 13(3), 257-261.
- Thomas, K. W. (1976). Conflict and conflict management. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 889-935). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
- Thomas, K. W. (1992). Conflict and conflict management: Reflections and update. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 13(3): 265-274.

Receiving Date: May 24, 2016

Reviewing Date: June October 3 & 10, 2016

Reporting Date of Article Appearance: June 11, 2016

5) "The idea of nonviolence as superior moral power is the key points that Gandhi sought..." (Dalton, 2012, p. 40).